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How to know the difference between two ciphertexts without key stream in stream ciphers


What is the difference between a stream cipher and a one-time-pad?How can I find two strings $m_1$ and $m_2$, knowing that I know $m_1 oplus m_2$?Determine the Key given ciphertexts and plaintexts?Significance of repetition in XOR cipher textWhy must the sender and receiver be synchronised in synchronous stream ciphers?2 round GOST_28147-89 cipher distinguisherWhat is the difference between a Stream cipher and a Symmetric Encryption algorithm?Combination of two stream ciphersAttack on stream cipherRe-encrypting a message and proving that the message has not changed













1












$begingroup$


If I have two cipher texts lets say $C_1$ and $C_2$ of the same length encrypted through stream cipher technique using the same keystream. Let's say they are:



$$C_1: texttt96 C6 A1 08 E7 F2 33 3B 3F 5C AB$$



$$C_2: texttt90 C6 A1 1E E6 F3 31 2B 37 4A B6$$



$C_1$ is encrypted as ($P_1 oplus textKeystream$) and $C_2$ by ($P_2 oplus textKeystream$) where $P_1$ and $P_2$ are corresponding plaintexts.



  • I am asked to tell how can I differentiate between corresponding plain text $P_1$ and plain text $P_2$ from $C_1$ and $C_2$ as an attacker without knowing the keystream?

So, I think the answer would be since both ciphers are encrypted through the same key stream, they would have similarities where the same plain text and keystream value exists. In this way, I can differentiate the other parts of the plain text. Is there anything more to it?
Thanks.










share|improve this question









New contributor




Tahir is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
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$endgroup$
















    1












    $begingroup$


    If I have two cipher texts lets say $C_1$ and $C_2$ of the same length encrypted through stream cipher technique using the same keystream. Let's say they are:



    $$C_1: texttt96 C6 A1 08 E7 F2 33 3B 3F 5C AB$$



    $$C_2: texttt90 C6 A1 1E E6 F3 31 2B 37 4A B6$$



    $C_1$ is encrypted as ($P_1 oplus textKeystream$) and $C_2$ by ($P_2 oplus textKeystream$) where $P_1$ and $P_2$ are corresponding plaintexts.



    • I am asked to tell how can I differentiate between corresponding plain text $P_1$ and plain text $P_2$ from $C_1$ and $C_2$ as an attacker without knowing the keystream?

    So, I think the answer would be since both ciphers are encrypted through the same key stream, they would have similarities where the same plain text and keystream value exists. In this way, I can differentiate the other parts of the plain text. Is there anything more to it?
    Thanks.










    share|improve this question









    New contributor




    Tahir is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
    Check out our Code of Conduct.







    $endgroup$














      1












      1








      1





      $begingroup$


      If I have two cipher texts lets say $C_1$ and $C_2$ of the same length encrypted through stream cipher technique using the same keystream. Let's say they are:



      $$C_1: texttt96 C6 A1 08 E7 F2 33 3B 3F 5C AB$$



      $$C_2: texttt90 C6 A1 1E E6 F3 31 2B 37 4A B6$$



      $C_1$ is encrypted as ($P_1 oplus textKeystream$) and $C_2$ by ($P_2 oplus textKeystream$) where $P_1$ and $P_2$ are corresponding plaintexts.



      • I am asked to tell how can I differentiate between corresponding plain text $P_1$ and plain text $P_2$ from $C_1$ and $C_2$ as an attacker without knowing the keystream?

      So, I think the answer would be since both ciphers are encrypted through the same key stream, they would have similarities where the same plain text and keystream value exists. In this way, I can differentiate the other parts of the plain text. Is there anything more to it?
      Thanks.










      share|improve this question









      New contributor




      Tahir is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
      Check out our Code of Conduct.







      $endgroup$




      If I have two cipher texts lets say $C_1$ and $C_2$ of the same length encrypted through stream cipher technique using the same keystream. Let's say they are:



      $$C_1: texttt96 C6 A1 08 E7 F2 33 3B 3F 5C AB$$



      $$C_2: texttt90 C6 A1 1E E6 F3 31 2B 37 4A B6$$



      $C_1$ is encrypted as ($P_1 oplus textKeystream$) and $C_2$ by ($P_2 oplus textKeystream$) where $P_1$ and $P_2$ are corresponding plaintexts.



      • I am asked to tell how can I differentiate between corresponding plain text $P_1$ and plain text $P_2$ from $C_1$ and $C_2$ as an attacker without knowing the keystream?

      So, I think the answer would be since both ciphers are encrypted through the same key stream, they would have similarities where the same plain text and keystream value exists. In this way, I can differentiate the other parts of the plain text. Is there anything more to it?
      Thanks.







      encryption stream-cipher






      share|improve this question









      New contributor




      Tahir is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
      Check out our Code of Conduct.











      share|improve this question









      New contributor




      Tahir is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
      Check out our Code of Conduct.









      share|improve this question




      share|improve this question








      edited 6 hours ago









      kelalaka

      8,69522351




      8,69522351






      New contributor




      Tahir is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
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      asked 7 hours ago









      TahirTahir

      83




      83




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      New contributor





      Tahir is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
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      Check out our Code of Conduct.




















          2 Answers
          2






          active

          oldest

          votes


















          2












          $begingroup$

          Let's say $C_1 = P_1 oplus K$ and $C_2 = P_2 oplus K$ where $P$ is a plaintext, $K$ is the key stream and $C$ is the ciphertext.



          Then if you XOR the two ciphertext together you get:



          $$C_1 oplus C_2 =\
          P_1 oplus K oplus P2 oplus K =\
          P_1 oplus P_2$$



          There are all kinds of interesting properties of the XOR of two plaintext together. For instance, one of the most common characters is the space, so you can easily guess many characters by just flipping a bit (space is 0x20 or 0b0010_0000 after all). You can see that a lot of combinations are not possible or unlikely and you can perform frequency analysis.



          This becomes even more powerful if you have 3 or more ciphertexts, as you can compare each and every pair, and if there are $n$ ciphertext then there are $n cdot (n - 1) over 2$ combinations to be made.






          share|improve this answer











          $endgroup$




















            0












            $begingroup$

            In the stream-ciphers, same key-stream is not used two times, I mean that when you encrypt P1 with a Keystream (P1⊕Keystream), the same key-stream should never used for encrypting P2 (P2⊕Keystream). if you use same key-stream for two different encryption, then you cipher-texts are susceptible to "two time pad Attack". In this attack, Attacker captures C1 and C2 which they are encrypted in this way:



             C1 = (P1⊕Keystream) 
            C2 = (P2⊕Keystream)


            Then attacker works out C1 ⊕ C2; which leads to P1 ⊕ P2. We know that (Keystream ⊕ Keystream = 1).



            Now attacker bases on some characteristics of plaintext (P1,P2) such as redundancy of ASCII codes, we can get the original plaintext.



            But we should remember that we use IV beside the Key for preventing of producing the same keystream.






            share|improve this answer









            $endgroup$













              Your Answer





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              2 Answers
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              active

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              2 Answers
              2






              active

              oldest

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              active

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              active

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              2












              $begingroup$

              Let's say $C_1 = P_1 oplus K$ and $C_2 = P_2 oplus K$ where $P$ is a plaintext, $K$ is the key stream and $C$ is the ciphertext.



              Then if you XOR the two ciphertext together you get:



              $$C_1 oplus C_2 =\
              P_1 oplus K oplus P2 oplus K =\
              P_1 oplus P_2$$



              There are all kinds of interesting properties of the XOR of two plaintext together. For instance, one of the most common characters is the space, so you can easily guess many characters by just flipping a bit (space is 0x20 or 0b0010_0000 after all). You can see that a lot of combinations are not possible or unlikely and you can perform frequency analysis.



              This becomes even more powerful if you have 3 or more ciphertexts, as you can compare each and every pair, and if there are $n$ ciphertext then there are $n cdot (n - 1) over 2$ combinations to be made.






              share|improve this answer











              $endgroup$

















                2












                $begingroup$

                Let's say $C_1 = P_1 oplus K$ and $C_2 = P_2 oplus K$ where $P$ is a plaintext, $K$ is the key stream and $C$ is the ciphertext.



                Then if you XOR the two ciphertext together you get:



                $$C_1 oplus C_2 =\
                P_1 oplus K oplus P2 oplus K =\
                P_1 oplus P_2$$



                There are all kinds of interesting properties of the XOR of two plaintext together. For instance, one of the most common characters is the space, so you can easily guess many characters by just flipping a bit (space is 0x20 or 0b0010_0000 after all). You can see that a lot of combinations are not possible or unlikely and you can perform frequency analysis.



                This becomes even more powerful if you have 3 or more ciphertexts, as you can compare each and every pair, and if there are $n$ ciphertext then there are $n cdot (n - 1) over 2$ combinations to be made.






                share|improve this answer











                $endgroup$















                  2












                  2








                  2





                  $begingroup$

                  Let's say $C_1 = P_1 oplus K$ and $C_2 = P_2 oplus K$ where $P$ is a plaintext, $K$ is the key stream and $C$ is the ciphertext.



                  Then if you XOR the two ciphertext together you get:



                  $$C_1 oplus C_2 =\
                  P_1 oplus K oplus P2 oplus K =\
                  P_1 oplus P_2$$



                  There are all kinds of interesting properties of the XOR of two plaintext together. For instance, one of the most common characters is the space, so you can easily guess many characters by just flipping a bit (space is 0x20 or 0b0010_0000 after all). You can see that a lot of combinations are not possible or unlikely and you can perform frequency analysis.



                  This becomes even more powerful if you have 3 or more ciphertexts, as you can compare each and every pair, and if there are $n$ ciphertext then there are $n cdot (n - 1) over 2$ combinations to be made.






                  share|improve this answer











                  $endgroup$



                  Let's say $C_1 = P_1 oplus K$ and $C_2 = P_2 oplus K$ where $P$ is a plaintext, $K$ is the key stream and $C$ is the ciphertext.



                  Then if you XOR the two ciphertext together you get:



                  $$C_1 oplus C_2 =\
                  P_1 oplus K oplus P2 oplus K =\
                  P_1 oplus P_2$$



                  There are all kinds of interesting properties of the XOR of two plaintext together. For instance, one of the most common characters is the space, so you can easily guess many characters by just flipping a bit (space is 0x20 or 0b0010_0000 after all). You can see that a lot of combinations are not possible or unlikely and you can perform frequency analysis.



                  This becomes even more powerful if you have 3 or more ciphertexts, as you can compare each and every pair, and if there are $n$ ciphertext then there are $n cdot (n - 1) over 2$ combinations to be made.







                  share|improve this answer














                  share|improve this answer



                  share|improve this answer








                  edited 4 hours ago

























                  answered 6 hours ago









                  Maarten BodewesMaarten Bodewes

                  55.7k679196




                  55.7k679196





















                      0












                      $begingroup$

                      In the stream-ciphers, same key-stream is not used two times, I mean that when you encrypt P1 with a Keystream (P1⊕Keystream), the same key-stream should never used for encrypting P2 (P2⊕Keystream). if you use same key-stream for two different encryption, then you cipher-texts are susceptible to "two time pad Attack". In this attack, Attacker captures C1 and C2 which they are encrypted in this way:



                       C1 = (P1⊕Keystream) 
                      C2 = (P2⊕Keystream)


                      Then attacker works out C1 ⊕ C2; which leads to P1 ⊕ P2. We know that (Keystream ⊕ Keystream = 1).



                      Now attacker bases on some characteristics of plaintext (P1,P2) such as redundancy of ASCII codes, we can get the original plaintext.



                      But we should remember that we use IV beside the Key for preventing of producing the same keystream.






                      share|improve this answer









                      $endgroup$

















                        0












                        $begingroup$

                        In the stream-ciphers, same key-stream is not used two times, I mean that when you encrypt P1 with a Keystream (P1⊕Keystream), the same key-stream should never used for encrypting P2 (P2⊕Keystream). if you use same key-stream for two different encryption, then you cipher-texts are susceptible to "two time pad Attack". In this attack, Attacker captures C1 and C2 which they are encrypted in this way:



                         C1 = (P1⊕Keystream) 
                        C2 = (P2⊕Keystream)


                        Then attacker works out C1 ⊕ C2; which leads to P1 ⊕ P2. We know that (Keystream ⊕ Keystream = 1).



                        Now attacker bases on some characteristics of plaintext (P1,P2) such as redundancy of ASCII codes, we can get the original plaintext.



                        But we should remember that we use IV beside the Key for preventing of producing the same keystream.






                        share|improve this answer









                        $endgroup$















                          0












                          0








                          0





                          $begingroup$

                          In the stream-ciphers, same key-stream is not used two times, I mean that when you encrypt P1 with a Keystream (P1⊕Keystream), the same key-stream should never used for encrypting P2 (P2⊕Keystream). if you use same key-stream for two different encryption, then you cipher-texts are susceptible to "two time pad Attack". In this attack, Attacker captures C1 and C2 which they are encrypted in this way:



                           C1 = (P1⊕Keystream) 
                          C2 = (P2⊕Keystream)


                          Then attacker works out C1 ⊕ C2; which leads to P1 ⊕ P2. We know that (Keystream ⊕ Keystream = 1).



                          Now attacker bases on some characteristics of plaintext (P1,P2) such as redundancy of ASCII codes, we can get the original plaintext.



                          But we should remember that we use IV beside the Key for preventing of producing the same keystream.






                          share|improve this answer









                          $endgroup$



                          In the stream-ciphers, same key-stream is not used two times, I mean that when you encrypt P1 with a Keystream (P1⊕Keystream), the same key-stream should never used for encrypting P2 (P2⊕Keystream). if you use same key-stream for two different encryption, then you cipher-texts are susceptible to "two time pad Attack". In this attack, Attacker captures C1 and C2 which they are encrypted in this way:



                           C1 = (P1⊕Keystream) 
                          C2 = (P2⊕Keystream)


                          Then attacker works out C1 ⊕ C2; which leads to P1 ⊕ P2. We know that (Keystream ⊕ Keystream = 1).



                          Now attacker bases on some characteristics of plaintext (P1,P2) such as redundancy of ASCII codes, we can get the original plaintext.



                          But we should remember that we use IV beside the Key for preventing of producing the same keystream.







                          share|improve this answer












                          share|improve this answer



                          share|improve this answer










                          answered 5 hours ago









                          Arsalan VahiArsalan Vahi

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